for the year 1967: .4/.45/.15 and
for the year 1968: .5/.3/.2--no further projection being made.
On February 11, 1966 McNaughton wrote in the diary: "McNamara this morning, while talking with Cy (Vance) and me, said that 'there is not a piece of paper -- no record -- showing when we changed from an advisory role to a combat role in Vietnam.'"
b. To bring about negotiations (by indirect third-party pressure flowing from fear of escalation and by direct pressure on Hanoi).
c. To provide a bargaining counter in negotiations (or in a tacit "minuet").
d. to sustain GVN and US morale.
On April 1, 1966, after McNaughton mentioned to his boss that he “was feeling a little like an engine that had become disconnected from the wheels” McNamara told McNaughton “not to leave the government until we talked.” McNamara attributed the lack of connection to what he saw as a shortage of clear policy in the government.
On April 8, 1966 McNaughton's diary records that "Bob (McNamara) in an unguarded moment said 'I want to give the order to our troops to get out of there so bad I can hardly stand it.'"
The April 30 diary entry observed, “There’s a certain weariness in the government.” He noted that “In State, Tom Mann is resigning; George Ball apparently intends to quit this summer; Bob McNamara is taking an awful beating from the press and from the Hill; I care less about things. Partly, it’s because I don’t feel I can ‘get through,’ but that’s not the main thing, because I’m sure I have more influence now than ever before—on the NATO reorganization, on the US reaction to France, on nuclear-sharing arrangements, on Vietnam, etc. [vii] It’s just that it thrills me less to get a sentence into a Presidential speech or to sit at a table with Cabinet officers, or to have dinner with a Prime Minister. I’m numbed. Perhaps it’s time for new blood.” [viii]
Chapter 6, Chapter 7, Chapter 8, Chapter 9, Epilogue. Acknowledgements